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Abstract
This Note analyzes respective legal arguments that Ukraine and the Crimean museums can
make to prove ownership of the objects. Part I establishes several elements key to the subsequent
discussion, including the political and historical background of this dispute, the relevant laws
on a national and international level, and the role of ethics and morality in the field of cultural
heritage laws generally. Part II will consider relevant cultural heritage case studies, including
treaties that divided cultural property after countries broke apart, the Thailand-Cambodian border
dispute and the temple of Preah Vihear, and cases involving Soviet nationalized art. Past case
studies can provide examples of how countries solved cultural heritage disputes that contained
similar elements to this Ukraine-Crimea dispute. Finally, Part III analyzes the legal arguments
that are available to both Ukraine and the Crimean museums within the context of the Ukrainian
laws, international conventions, and case studies discussed in Parts I and II. This Note argues that
although the artifacts should be returned to the Crimean museums for moral reasons, the law as it
stands does not support this position.
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INTRODUCTION
The current political conflict in Ukraine has caused an unusual
cultural heritage problem that has been difficult to solve both legally
and diplomatically.1 In February 2014, the Allard Pierson Museum in
the Netherlands premiered an exhibit called “Crimea: Gold and
Secrets of the Black Sea.”2 The exhibit included Scythian art objects
from five Ukrainian museums—four of which are in Crimea.3
Ukraine had never before lent out so many Crimean treasures to an
international exhibit.4 That same month, as a result of the Euromaidan
revolution, Russia sent troops into Crimea, a referendum was held,

1. See generally Paul Sonne, Scythian Gold Caught in Ukraine Dispute ‘Crimea: Gold
and Secrets from the Black Sea,’ Exhibit on Display in Amsterdam, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 28,
2014),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304157204579471111226424466
(noting that the Allard Pierson Museum, which displayed the Crimean exhibit says it plans to
return the objects according to their “legal ownership”); Benjamin Durr, ‘Cold war’ over
Crimean Gold, AL JAZEERA (Aug. 24, 2014), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/
2014/08/war-over-crimean-gold-proxy-ukraine-russia-amersterdam201482392137799800.html (describing the art conflict as a proxy fight amid the ongoing crisis
between Russia and the West); Culture Wars in Ukraine: History Lessons, ECONOMIST (Apr.
19, 2014), http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21601043-conflict-ukraine-spreads-itsmuseums-history-lessons [hereinafter Culture Wars] (noting that whether the gold returns to
Crimea or to Kiev, each side will accuse the Dutch of pilfering); Toby Sterling, Dutch Doubt
Where to Return Crimean Gold, AP (Apr. 4, 2014), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/dutch-doubtwhere-return-crimean-gold (reporting that the Allard Pierson Museum has enlisted experts
from the University of Amsterdam and the Dutch Foreign Ministry for advice on where to
return the cultural heritage); Lydia Epp Schmidt, Four Museums in Crimea Fear Losing
Hundreds of Precious Artifacts, ARTNET NEWS (Mar. 28, 2014), http://news.artnet.com/inbrief/four-museums-in-crimea-fear-losing-hundreds-of-precious-artifacts-7792 (arguing that
the art objects are technically part of the “national state fund” of Ukraine but have long been
held in Crimea).
2. Sterling, supra note 1 (observing that a major theme of the exhibition is Crimea’s
history of frequent conquests by different peoples and cultures); Sonne, supra note 1 (reporting
that the exhibit was the largest ever modern exhibit of Crimea’s ancient treasures abroad).
3. Schmidt, supra note 1 (reporting that curators from the Crimean museums are worried
they will never get the items back); Sterling, supra note 1 (same).
4. Culture Wars, supra note 1 (reporting that the exhibit included a Scythian gold helmet
from 400 BC, pottery from Greek colonizers and a lacquered Chinese box that came along the
Silk Road); Dutch Museum Caught in Fallout from Crimea Conflict, IRISH TIMES, (Mar. 29,
2014), http://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/dutch-museum-caught-in-fallout-fromcrimea-conflict-1.1742176 (quoting the Allard Pierson Museum as saying that the exhibit cast
new light on the Scythians, Goths and Huns, “for centuries dismissed as little more than
barbarians”).
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and Crimea seceded from Ukraine and was annexed by Russia.5 In the
Netherlands, the exhibit was scheduled to end in May, and both
Ukraine and Russia claimed ownership over the loaned art objects.6
The Allard Pierson Museum found itself in a difficult political and
legal situation, unsure of where to return the art objects in dispute.7
The museum decided to hold onto the art until a legal solution could
be found.8 On November 19, 2014, the four Crimean museums filed a
lawsuit in Amsterdam against the Allard Pierson Museum, claiming
that the art objects should be returned to the institutions with the
strongest cultural heritage ties.9
The main legal issue in this dispute will be proving rightful
ownership.10 Ukraine claims to be the rightful owners of the cultural
heritage artifacts because the Ministry of Culture signed the contracts

5. Sonne, supra note 1 (explaining that after the museums loaned the art objects to the
Allard Pierson museum in the Netherlands, Ukraine underwent political protests and a change
in government; Russia sent troops into Crimea; Crimea held a referendum to secede from
Ukraine and join Russia; and Russia annexed Crimea in March 2014); Durr, supra note 1
(same). For a definition of “Euromaidan,” see infra note 37 and accompanying text.
6. Durr, supra note 1 (noting that the art conflict further complicates Netherlands
relationship with Russia); Allard Pierson Museum Holding Artifacts Claimed by Both Russia
and Ukraine, COMMITTEE FOR CULTURAL POLICY, (Aug. 23, 2014) [hereinafter Allard
Pierson
Museum]
http://committeeforculturalpolicy.org/allard-pierson-museum-holdingartifacts-claimed-by-both-russia-and-ukraine/.
7. See generally Sonne, supra note 1 (quoting the Allard Pierson Museum saying that it
plans to return the objects according to their “legal ownership); Culture Wars, supra note 1
(observing that whether the gold returns to Crimea or to Kiev, each side will accuse the Dutch
of pilfering); Irvina Matviyishyn, Should Loaned Treasures go to Kyiv or Crimea, KYIVPOST
(Oct. 9, 2014), https://www.kyivpost.com/content/kyiv/should-loaned-treasures-go-to-kyiv-orcrimea-367543.html (same).
8. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (referring to the Allard Pierson museum’s
decision to keep the objects until a legal or diplomatic solution was found).
9. Henri Neuendorf, Crimean Gold Dispute Culminates in Lawsuit, ARTNET NEWS
(Nov. 28, 2014), http://news.artnet.com/in-brief/crimean-gold-dispute-culminates-in-lawsuit183777 (adding that “the objects on display must be returned to where they were discovered
and where they were preserved . . . . and that is the museums of Crimea.”); Crimean Museums
File Lawsuit Over Scythian Gold Collection, SPUTNIK NEWS (Nov. 25, 2013),
http://sputniknews.com/society/20141126/1015190459.html (reporting that the four Crimean
museums consist of the Central Tavrida Museum, the Kerch Historical and Cultural Preserve,
the Bakhchisarai Historical and Cultural Preserve and the Tauric Chersonese National
Preserve). Negotiations may still be underway to arrive at an out-of-court agreement, but as of
February 2015, the parties could not reach a solution. Id.
10. Culture Wars, supra note 1(describing the complexity of the dispute where the
Netherlands does not recognize Russia’s annexation of Crimea but the Allard Pierson Museum
signed loan agreements with both the Ukrainian government and the individual Crimean
museums); Sonne, supra note 1 (same).
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with the Allard Pierson Museum and approved the exhibit abroad.11
Ukraine’s Culture Minister labeled the situation “of national security
for the Ukrainian government’s cultural possessions.”12 The Allard
Pierson Museum, however, also signed contracts with the individual
Crimean museums, which are now part of the Russian Federation.13
The Museum seems to have a duty to Ukraine and the Crimean
museums.14 The legal situation is further complicated because the
majority of the world and the United Nations do not recognize
Russia’s annexation of Crimea.15
Arguments regarding where the art objects should be returned go
to both extremes. For example, Inge van der Vlies, a professor at the
University of Amsterdam, argues that there is an ethical case for
returning the objects to Crimea.16 However, because the Dutch
government does not recognize Russia’s annexation of Crimea, it
cannot return the objects to the Crimean museums due to its legal and
political obligations to Ukraine.17
This Note analyzes respective legal arguments that Ukraine and
the Crimean museums can make to prove ownership of the objects.
Part I establishes several elements key to the subsequent discussion,
including the political and historical background of this dispute, the
relevant laws on a national and international level, and the role of
11. Durr, supra note 1 (reporting that according to Ukraine, returning the art objects to
Crimea would mean that they end up in Russian hands); Culture Wars, supra note 1 (same).
Unfortunately, this Note will not be able to analyze any loan agreements made between the
parties in this dispute. No legal documents have been made public as of May, 2015.
12. Sonne, supra note 1 (arguing that the items belong to Ukraine rather than Russia).
13. Durr, supra note 1 (determining that the contracts with the museums are the basis to
determine where the gold has to be returned); Culture Wars, supra note 1(same).
14. Culture Wars, supra note 1 (contemplating rightful ownership as the Allard Pierson
Museum has signed loan agreements with both the Ukrainian government and the individual
Crimean museums); Durr, supra note 1 (same).
15. Territorial Integrity of Ukraine, G.A. Res. 68 A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/68/262 (Apr. 1,
2014). The Resolution states:
Calls upon all States, international organizations and specialized agencies not to
recognize any alteration of the status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and
the city of Sevastopol on the basis of the above-mentioned referendum and to
refrain from any action or dealing that might be interpreted as recognizing any such
altered status.
Id.
16. Culture Wars, supra note 1 (noting that there is no guarantee that Russia will not
take the art pieces as soon as they arrive back to Crimea).
17. Neuendorf, supra note 9 (showing that the Allard Pierson Museum agreed to “abide
by a ruling by a qualified judge or arbitrator, or further agreement between the parties”); Durr,
supra, note 1 (explaining that this art conflict is just an example of a bigger “cold conflict”
between Russia, Ukraine and the West).
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ethics and morality in the field of cultural heritage laws generally.
Part II will consider relevant cultural heritage case studies, including
treaties that divided cultural property after countries broke apart, the
Thailand-Cambodian border dispute and the temple of Preah Vihear,
and cases involving Soviet nationalized art. Past case studies can
provide examples of how countries solved cultural heritage disputes
that contained similar elements to this Ukraine-Crimea dispute.
Finally, Part III analyzes the legal arguments that are available to both
Ukraine and the Crimean museums within the context of the
Ukrainian laws, international conventions, and case studies discussed
in Parts I and II. This Note argues that although the artifacts should be
returned to the Crimean museums for moral reasons, the law as it
stands does not support this position.
I. FACTUAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND: THE EVOLUTION OF
THE CRIMEA DISPUTE AND THE CULTURAL HERITAGE LAWS
INVOLVED IN THIS CONFLICT
Part I discusses the historical background to the current conflict,
as well as the laws and international treaties that could come into
question as the Amsterdam court tries to solve the dispute between
Ukraine and the museums in Crimea. Part I.A briefly outlines the
history of Crimea and its relationship with Ukraine and Russia, the
revolution in Ukraine that led to Russia’s annexation of Crimea, and
the ensuing cultural heritage dispute. Part I.B introduces the
international treaties and the cultural heritage laws relevant to the
dispute. Part I.C considers the role morality plays in cultural heritage
law.
A. Factual Background
1. Relevant History of Crimea
Understanding the political and territorial history of Crimea
sheds light on the complications of this dispute.18 Crimea has been
colonized, invaded, and settled by many groups since the beginning of
its history, including by the ancient Greeks, groups of Eurasian
nomads called the Scythians, Turkic speaking Tatars, and the
18. This Note will only succinctly outline the moments in Crimea’s history as it goes
back and forth between nations. The Author acknowledges that Crimea’s history is much more
intricate and complex.
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Ottomans.19 Catherine the Great of Imperial Russia defeated the
Ottomans and formally annexed Crimea in 1783.20 Under the USSR,
Crimea was an autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (“SSR”) until
1945, when it became a province of the Russian Soviet Federative
Socialist Republic.21 In 1954, Crimea became a province of the
Ukrainian SSR.22 After the breakup of the USSR, Crimea became part
of Ukraine as the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol
City.23 During the 1990s, Crimea had a contentious relationship with
Ukraine: during that time period Crimea issued declarations of
independence, referendums, and Crimean constitutions.24 Since the
breakup of the USSR, Ukraine has been split ethnically, linguistically,
and politically, into two—the Ukrainian speaking, European-leaning
western half and the Russian speaking, Kremlin-leaning eastern
half.25 This situation often set ethnic Ukrainians against ethnic
19. Doris Wydra, The Crimea Conundrum: The Tug of War Between Russia and Ukraine
on the Questions of Autonomy and Self Determination, 10 INT’L J. MINORITY & GROUP RTS.
111, 112 (2003) (“The peninsula has always been a homeland for numerous peoples, such as
the Scythians, the Greeks and the Tatars.”); Facts You Need To Know About Crimea And Why
it is in Turmoil, RT NEWS (Feb. 27, 2014), http://rt.com/news/crimea-facts-protests-politics945/ (describing how the Crimean peninsula has been colonized and conquered by historic
empires and nomadic tribes).
20. M. S. Anderson, The Great Powers and the Russian Annexation of the Crimea, 17834, 37 THE SLAVONIC & E. EUR. REV. 17, 18 (1958); ALAN W. FISHER, THE RUSSIAN
ANNEXATION OF THE CRIMEA, 1772-1783, 135 (1970) (detailing that in April 1783, Catherine
the Great signed a manifesto declaring the annexation of Crimea by Russia).
21. See Wydra, supra note 19 at 113 (linking the transfer to the mass deportation of
Tatars mainly to Uzbekistan in 1944); GWENDOLYN SASSE, THE CRIMEA QUESTION:
IDENTITY, TRANSITION, AND CONFLICT, 95 (1972) (noting that Crimea became an oblast
within the Russian SFSR on June 30, 1945).
22. See Sasse, supra note 21, at 95 (clarifying that the transfer of Crimea was seen as a
“gift” to the Ukrainian SSR to commemorate the 300th anniversary of the Pereiaslav Treaty,
when Ukraine unified with Russia in 1654); Wydra, supra note 19, at 113 (same).
23. See Wydra, supra note 19, at 115 (referring to November 1990 treaty between
Ukraine and the Russian Federation and the CIS Agreement); Adam Taylor, To Understand
Crimea, Take a Look Back at its Complicated History, WASH. POST (Feb. 27, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/02/27/to-understand-crimea-takea-look-back-at-its-complicated-history/ (noting that when Ukraine held a referendum on
independence in December 1991, 54% of Crimean voters favored independence from Russia).
24. See Wydra, supra note 19, at 114-20 (discussing the various ways that Crimea has
tried to gain independence after the breakup of the Soviet Union and its contentious
relationship with Ukraine); Alessandra Stanley, Crimea Is Waging a War of Nerves With
Ukraine, N.Y. TIMES, (May 30, 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/05/30/world/crimea-iswaging-a-war-of-nerves-with-ukraine.html (describing Crimea’s attempt to gain independence
from Ukraine in the early 1990s).
25. See Max Biedermann, Ukraine: Between Scylla and Charybdis, 40 N.C. J. INT’L L. &
COM. REG. 230 (discussing Ukrainians’ political differences while exploring the implications
that joining either the European Union or the Eurasian Customs Union will have for Ukraine);

2015]

WHO OWNS THE SCYTHIAN GOLD?

1267

Russians in deciding elections and in shaping Ukraine’s relationship
with Russia and the European Union.26 In 1997, Russia signed a
“friendship treaty” with Ukraine that allowed Russia to keep its
military bases and naval fleet in Crimea in exchange for forgiving
Ukraine’s debt to Russia.27 Russia has continued to view its presence
in Crimea as an important defensive assurance against the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (“NATO”) expansion.28 Russia,
Ukraine, and Crimea have a long interconnected history that colors
contemporary regional politics and culture in ways that complicate
the legal dispute discussed in this Note.
2. Description of the Current Political Crisis
The current political crisis in Ukraine began in November 2013
when President Yanukovych abandoned the Deep and Comprehensive
Free Trade Area (“DCFTA”) agreement that would have significantly
expanded economic ties between the European Union and Ukraine.29
Instead of strengthening ties with the European Union, President
R.L.G., Johnson: Is There a Single Ukraine?, ECONOMIST (Feb. 5, 2014),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/prospero/2014/02/linguistic-divides (commenting that the
west and north are predominantly Ukrainian-speaking, while the east and south are primarily
Russian speaking).
26. See Biedermann, supra note 25, at 230 (referring to the current conflict in Ukraine as
former President Yanukovych was elected by a majority of votes from the pro-Russian
population in the east while the current President Petro Poroshenko is a “pro-European
billionaire” who won with low voter turnout, especially among the pro-Russian voters in the
eastern half of Ukraine); R.L.G., supra note 25 (asking if modern Ukraine is truly one nation).
27. Treaty Between the Russian Federation and Ukraine on Friendship, Cooperation and
Partnership, Russ.-Ukr., May 31, 1997, U.N. Doc. A/52/174 (“The agreements that have been
signed create conditions for the normal operation of the Russian Black Sea fleet and its lease
of the main base in Sevastopol for 20 years. The agreements will help strengthen security and
stability in the region.”).
28. Michael Specter, Setting Past Aside, Russia and Ukraine Sign Friendship Treaty,
N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 1997), http://www.nytimes.com/1997/06/01/world/setting-past-asiderussia-and-ukraine-sign-friendship-treaty.html (arguing that Russia signed the friendship treaty
with Ukraine to bolster its defenses in the wake of NATO expansion eastward); John J.
Mearsheimer, Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions That
Provoked Putin, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Sept./Oct. 2014), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/
141769/john-j-mearsheimer/why-the-ukraine-crisis-is-the-wests-fault (noting that “since the
mid-1990s, Russian leaders have adamantly opposed NATO enlargement, and in recent years,
they have made it clear that they would not stand by while their strategically important
neighbor turned into a Western bastion”).
29. Ukraine Crisis: Timeline, BBC NEWS (Nov. 13, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-middle-east-26248275 (claiming that Ukaine chose to seek closer ties with Russia
instead); Mearsheimer, supra note 28 (describing the economic agreement as “triple package
of policies” which included NATO enlargement, EU expansion, and democracy promotion).
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Yanukovych signed an agreement with Russia, which included terms
such as lowered gas prices and US$15 billion in investments.30
Competing theories exist as to why Yanukovych declined the deal.31
Some political commentators argue that Yanukovych was using the
prospect of the DCFTA as leverage to get a better agreement from the
Russians.32 Other commentators say that the European Union should
not have insisted that Yulia Timoshenko, a former prime minister and
Yanukovych’s political rival, be freed from jail.33 Some
commentators further say that the deal should have included a
provision for Ukraine’s eventual membership into the European
Union.34 Another theory is that the partnership between Ukraine and
the European Union was misconceived by Russia as a gateway for
NATO’s influence to reach further into Eastern Europe.35 After the
deal with the European Union fell through, thousands of Ukrainians
began to protest in Kiev against President Yanukovych and the

30. Damien McElroy, Ukraine Receives Half Price Gas and $15 Billion to Stick with
Russia, TELEGRAPH (Dec. 17, 2013), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news (critiquing the deal as
coming at the expense of closer ties with the European Union); Daryna Krasnolutska, Olga
Tanas & Ilya Arkhipov, Ukraine Getting $15 Billion From Russia Raises Questions,
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 17, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-12-17/russiacommits-15-billion-to-ukraine-bonds-as-gas-price-reduced
(questioning
Yanukovych’s
motives).
31. Keep the Door Open, ECONOMIST (Feb. 8, 2014), http://www.economist.com/news/
europe/21595957-how-europe-nearly-lost-ukrainebut-may-yet-regain-it-keep-door-open
(describing the situation as a bidding war with Russia); Biedermann, supra note 25
(considering the varying theories on why Yanukovych did not sign the deal with the European
Union).
32. Keep the Door Open, supra note 31 (asserting that Yanukovych played the European
Union like fools); Putin’s Gambit: How the EU Lost Ukraine, SPIEGEL ONLINE, (Nov. 15,
2013), [hereinafter Putin’s Gambit] http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/how-the-eulost-to-russia-in-negotiations-over-ukraine-trade-deal-a-935476.html (stating that Yanukovych
kept all options open until the end, so as to get the best possible deal).
33. Keep the Door Open, supra note 31 (clarifying that Timoshenko was jailed by
Yanukovych himself); Putin’s Gambit, supra note 32 (noting that Yanukovych was unwilling
to release his former rival, and the parliament in Kiev failed to approve a bill that would have
secured her release).
34. Keep the Door Open, supra note 31 (arguing that the deal failed because it lacked
membership into the European Union); Hilary Appel, EU Accession and the Ukraine Crisis,
OPEN DEMOCRACY (Sept. 25, 2014), https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/hilaryappel/eu-accession-and-ukraine-crisis (“The EU’s unwillingness to offer a membership
prospect has often been lost in the vast coverage of recent events.”).
35. Keep the Door Open, supra note 31 (blaming the failure of the European Union deal
on NATO expansion); Mearsheimer, supra note 28 (arguing that in the eyes of Russian
leaders, “EU expansion is a stalking horse for NATO expansion”).
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Ukrainian government.36 The demonstrations turned violent, with
clashes between the “Euromaidan” protesters and the police.37 On
February 21, 2014, Yanukovych signed a European-brokered deal
with the leaders of the protest movement, who called for new
presidential elections at the end of the year.38 Despite the agreement,
protests continued because many demanded Yanukovych’s immediate
resignation.39 Yanukovych eventually fled Kiev, with the protesters
taking over the government buildings.40
In February, Russia sent troops in military uniforms but without
any labels or insignia into Crimea and took over the airport and
government buildings.41 A referendum was held in Crimea on March
16, 2014 to rejoin Russia or return to the 1992 Constitution.42 Crimea
36. Ukraine Crisis, supra note 29 (reporting that 100,000 people attended a
demonstration in Kiev); Oksana Grytenko, Ukrainian Protesters Flood Kiev After President
Pulls out of EU Deal, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 24, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2013/nov/24/ukraine-protesters-yanukovych-aborts-eu-deal-russia (same).
37. Ukraine Crisis, supra note 29 (reporting that the clashes between protestors and
police became more violent after the Ukrainian parliament passed anti-protest laws that were
later repealed). The movement gets the name Euromaidan because the protestors began in
Maidan Nezalezhnosti (“Independence Square”) in Kiev. See Jim Heintz, Ukraine’s
Euromaidan: What’s in a Name?, YAHOO! NEWS (Dec. 2, 2013, 4:49 AM)
http://news.yahoo.com/ukraines-euromaidan-whats-name-090717845.html.
38. Ukraine Crisis, supra note 29 (noting that the deal soon became redundant); Why is
Ukraine in turmoil? BBC NEWS (Feb. 22, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe25182823 (explaining that the clashes between protestors and police became more violent after
the Ukrainian parliament passed anti-protest laws that were later repealed).
39. Why is Ukraine in Turmoil?, supra note 38 (reporting that protestors became angry
over amnesty for imprisoned protestors); Andrew Higgins & Andrew E. Kramer, Ukraine has
Deal, but both Russia and Protestors are Wary, NY TIMES (Feb. 21, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/22/world/europe/ukraine.html?_r=0
(describing
the
unsatisfaction of protestors).
40. Ukraine Crisis, supra note 29 (commenting that Protesters took control of
presidential administration buildings); Sam Frizell, Ukraine Protestors Seize Kiev as President
Flees, TIME (Feb. 22, 2014), http://world.time.com/2014/02/22/ukraines-president-fleesprotestors-capture-kiev/ (describing how President Viktor Yanukovych fled Kiev just hours
after signing a European Union-sponsored peace deal).
41. Ukraine Crisis, supra note 29 (characterizing the troops as unidentified gunmen);
Mark Mackinnon, Globe in Ukraine: Russian-backed Fighters Restrict Access to Crimean
City, GLOBE & MAIL, (last updated May. 12 2014, 12:35 PM) http://
www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/tension-in-crimea-as-pro-russia-and-pro-ukrainegroups-stage-competing-rallies/article17110382/#dashboard/follows/?cmpId=tgc (same); Putin
Admits Russian Forces were Deployed to Crimea, REUTERS, (Apr 17, 2014 9:51 AM BST)
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/04/17/russia-putin-crimea-IdUKL6N0N921H20140417
(reporting on Putin’s admission of deployment of troops in Crimea).
42. Ukraine Crisis, supra note 29 (specifying that the referendum vote was considered a
sham by the West); Crimea referendum: Voters Back Russia Union, BBC (Mar. 16, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26606097 (same).
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reported that 95.5% of voters chose to rejoin Russia.43 The United
States and the European Union maintain that the referendum was
illegal and illegitimate.44
Debate has ensued over the proper classification of the crisis in
Ukraine.45 Despite the fact that there were Russian troops on
Ukrainian territory—a fact that Vladimir Putin has admitted46—the
international community has been reluctant to label the situation an
international armed conflict because of the lack of “armed hostilities
between two or more governments” during the occupation of
Crimea.47 The International Committee of the Red Cross has
described the events in Eastern Ukraine as a “non-international armed
conflict.”48 US observers commented that Russian forces had
operational control in Crimea and blockaded Ukrainian naval and

43. Ukraine Crisis, supra note 29 (citing organizers of the referendum); Crimea
Referendum, supra note 42 (same).
44. Ukraine Crisis, supra note 29 (reporting that The European Union and United States
impose travel bans and asset freezes on several officials from Russia and Ukraine over the
Crimea referendum); Crimea Officially Moves to Join Russia, ALJAZEERA (Mar. 17, 2014),
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2014/03/crimea-russia-20143179915762292.html
(reporting that the European Union said the referendum was “illegal and illegitimate” and its
outcome would not be recognized. President Barack Obama told Russian President Vladimir
Putin that Crimea’s vote to secede from Ukraine and join Russia “would never be recognized”
by the United States).
45. Andrew Higgins, On Ukraine, the West Sidesteps a Fraught Term, NY TIMES (Sept.
4, 2014) http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/05/world/europe/in-west-fine-line-on-labelingukraine-crisis.html?_r=0 (contemplating that calling the situation in Ukraine an invasion will
put pressure on the United States to intervene militarily); Mark Gollom, Ukraine crisis: Why
the U.S. Avoids Calling Russia’s Actions an ‘Invasion,’ CBS, (Sept. 1, 2014), http://
www.cbc.ca/news/world/ukraine-crisis-why-the-u-s-avoIds-calling-russia-s-actions-aninvasion-1.2750469 (discussing why The United States avoids calling Russia’s actions in
Ukraine an invasion).
46. Brett Logiurato, Putin Finally Admits to Sending Troops to Crimea, BUSINESS
INSIDER (Apr. 17, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/putin-admits-troops-crimea-20144#ixzz3bJ0vi1uI (emphasizing that this is the first time that Putin has admitted such
involvement by Russia in Ukraine); Putin Admits Russian Forces Were Deployed in Crimea,
supra note 41 (same).
47. Eastern Ukraine: Questions and Answers about the Laws of War, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, (Sept. 11, 2014), http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/09/11/eastern-ukraine-questionsand-answers-about-laws-war (explaining that Russian troops in Crimea triggered the
international law on occupation).
48. Red Cross Admits Ukraine is in a State of Civil War, ITAR-TASS (July 23, 2014),
http://en.itar-tass.com/world/742051 (defining events as a civil war); Tom Miles, Ukraine War
Crimes Trials: A Step Closer After Red Cross Assessment, REUTERS (Jul. 22, 2014),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/22/us-ukraine-crisis-warcrimesIDUSKBN0FR0V920140722 (same).
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military access.49 Additionally, while Russian forces were in Crimea
prior to the referendum vote, the forces oversaw the disarming of
military installations in the area and begun issuing new naturalization
documents to Ukrainian citizens in Crimea.50 Such actions indicated
that Russian forces exercised actual authority in Crimea.51 The backand-forth nature of Crimea’s territorial history with Russia and
Ukraine is important to understanding the current political crisis in
Ukraine and why Russia wanted to quickly secure the area after
Ukraine chose a pro-European Union government.52
3. Discussion of the Cultural Heritage Conflict
Once the news broke that both the Crimean museums and the
Ukrainian Ministry of Culture requested the loaned art objects from
the Allard Pierson Museum, the Crimean museums issued a press
release explaining why the objects should be returned to them.53 They
explained that the objects in the dispute can be traced back a thousand
years B.C. to civilizations that lived on the Crimean Peninsula.54
Moreover, the items always have been kept and studied on the
49. Zoe Niesel, Collateral Damage: Protecting Cultural Heritage in Crimea and Eastern
Ukraine, THE COMMON L., WAKE FOREST L. REV., (2014), http://wakeforestlawreview.com/
2014/08/collateral-damage-protecting-cultural-heritage-in-crimea-and-eastern-ukraine/
(arguing that the situation in Crimea should be labled an occupation); Marie-Louise
Gumuchian et al., Ukraine Mobilizes Troops After Russia’s “Declaration of War”, CNN (Mar.
3, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/03/02/world/europe/ukraine-politics/ (same).
50. See Niesel, supra note 49 (indicating that Russian troops have actual authority in
Crimea); Natalia Antelava, The Creeping Annexation of Crimea, NEW YORKER (Mar. 5,
2014), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2014/03/the-creeping-annexationof-crimea.html (outlining the events before the referendum).
51. See Niesel, supra note 50 (refering to the troops blockading Ukrainian naval and
military access); Antelava, supra note 51 (citing the troops’ control of the government
buildings).
52. See generally Mark Kramer, Why Russia Intervenes, PERSPECTIVES ON PEACE AND
SECURITY,
August
2014,
http://perspectives.carnegie.org/us-russia/russia-intervenes/
(analyzing theories on why Russia intervened after the Euromaidan revolution); Mearsheimer,
supra note 28 (contending that Crimea also made for an easy target because ethnic Russians
compose roughly 60 percent of its population); Michael McFaul, Stephen Sestanovich & John
J. Mearsheimer, Faulty Powers: Who Started the Ukraine Crisis?, FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
(Nov./Dec. 2014), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/142260/michael-mcfaul-stephensestanovich-john-j-mearsheimer/faulty-powers (challenging Mearsheimer’s argument that
Russia has annexed Crimea and intervened in eastern Ukraine in response to NATO
expansion).
53. See Press Release, Statement Made by the Crimean Musea Regarding the Exhibition
Crimea. The Golden Island in the Black Sea, (Oct. 15, 2014), http://www.kerch-museum.com/
ru/news/press-reliz0.html (declaring the Crimean museums as legal owners of the art objects).
54. Id. (emphasizing Crimea’s particular history).
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territory where they were found by the Crimean museums.55 The
museums consider the art objects to be the cultural heritage of
Crimea.56
The Crimean Peninsula itself belonged to different states over the
last one hundred years . . . . No matter to what state the Crimean
Peninsula has belonged, the Crimean archeological findings have
always been safeguarded and studied solely by the Crimean
Musea . . . . The loss of archeological findings will impoverish
the collection . . . . The loss of these exhibits means for us both
the loss of items of world importance and the loss of
archeological heritage constituting the core of the cultural code
of our people.57

There is an enormous potential for loss, both cultural and
financial, should the objects not be returned to the Crimean
museums.58 For example, the Tavrida Central Museum in the city of
Simferopol loaned 132 artifacts, with an insured value of
US$217,000, to the Allard Pierson Museum.59 Andrey Malgin, the
museum's director, explained that, as is customary with loan
collections, the museum has concluded a contract with the Allard
Pierson Museum with the condition that the artifacts must be returned
to the museum.60 The items, however, are property of both the
museum and the State, he said.61 Commenting on the lawsuit, Malgin
maintained that the objects must return to the place where they were
discovered and preserved, which is the museum in Crimea.62 Also, the
integrity of a collection frequently is put forward as a reason for the
repatriation of cultural heritage.63 Integrity of a collection usually is
55. Id. (invoking the preservation of information argument).
56. Id. (describing the museums as unique research centers employing real experts in the
Crimean ancient history).
57. Id. (emphasizing the tie between the art objects and the Crimean people).
58. Durr, supra note 1 (referencing the above Tavrida Central Museum example); Allard
Pierson Museum, supra note 6 (same).
59. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
60. Durr, supra note 1 (arguing that “museum property is primary and more fundamental
than the property of the state.”).
61. Id.
62. Neuendorf, supra note 9 (discussing the lawsuit filed by the Crimean Museums in
the Dutch court).
63. See BEAT SCHÖNENBERGER, THE RESTITUTION OF CULTURAL ASSETS: CAUSES OF
ACTION, OBSTACLES TO RESTITUTION, DEVELOPMENTS 49-50 (2009) (discussing how the
integrity of an object can be used for or against restitution); IRINI A. STAMATOUDI, CULTURAL
PROPERTY LAW AND RESTITUTION: A COMMENTARY TO INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS
AND EUROPEAN UNION LAW 252 (2011) (same).
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cited when the value of a piece is dependent on cross-referencing with
other items in the collection.64 Furthermore, keeping a collection
together is important for academic research and documentation as the
items can be studied together and referenced to demonstrate how the
collection was put together.65
However, the loan agreements—as they have been portrayed in
the news seem to favor Ukraine.66 Larisa Sedikova, deputy director of
the Crimean museum Chersonesos, an ancient Greek city and a
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
(“UNESCO”) heritage site in Sevastopol, stated that the contract for
the exhibition stipulates that the objects should return to Ukraine in
the event of a force majeure.67 "But we do not consider this a force
majeure," she stated, noting that Chersonesos faces no threat of
damage.68 Rather, Ukraine and UNESCO are mostly worried that
Russia plans on taking cultural heritage located in the Crimea and
moving them to State museums in Moscow and St. Petersburg.69 They
have warned Russia to safeguard “Ukraine’s” cultural heritage.70 The
Russian State Hermitage Museum in St. Petersburg even issued a
statement on the matter:
In the light of reports in a number of mass media on the alleged
willingness of Russians museum directorates to take hold of the
Crimean arts values that are currently exhibited in Europe, the
State Hermitage Museum would like to make it clear that the
concern the Association of Russian Museums and the Hermitage
experts have expressed over the destiny of treasures from the
Crimean museums does not mean in any way that either the State

64. SCHÖNENBERGER supra note 63, at 49-50 (clarifying that this facilitates educational
research); STAMATOUDI, supra note 63, at 252 n.121 (asserting that the whole of the object
and its cultural environment is better than the part).
65. SCHÖNENBERGER, supra note 63, at 49-50 (arguing that the integrity of a collection
may be imperative for the future academic research); STAMATOUDI, supra note 63, at 29
(same).
66. Durr, supra note 1 (arguing that the Allard Pierson Museum has to fulfill its
obligations vis-a-vis Ukraine first and foremost); Culture Wars, supra note 1 (same).
67. Sonne, supra note 1 (quoting Ms. Sedikova as saying “It’s important that [the art
items] are not stolen from us").
68. Id.
69. Follow up by UNESCO of the Situation in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea,
U.N. Doc. 194 EX/32 (Apr. 3, 2014), available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/
0022/002272/227294e.pdf (noting that the “reported massive transfer of priceless cultural
objects from Crimean museums to the Russian capital is alarming”).
70. Id. (reminding Russia of its obligations under international cultural heritage law).
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Hermitage Museum or any other Russian museums have claims
to the Crimean museum collections.71

Notably, Russia appears to be making efforts to work with the
Crimean museums and archeologists to stop the smuggling of cultural
heritage artifacts from ancient sites.72 Consequently, the Crimean
museums could point to the unstable situation in Ukraine to argue that
the art objects would be safer and better preserved in Crimea with the
support of Russia.73 While the political and cultural history of the area
is important to understanding why this dispute came about, the
international treaties and domestic cultural heritage laws are
important in considering how this dispute may be resolved.
B. Legal Underpinnings
Depending on the scope of the given convention, international
cultural heritage treaties can be applied to both inter-state and private
disputes, or even just to consider the general principles derived
therein.74 The international conventions have been important to the
repatriation of cultural heritage objects because they provide a
consistent and coherent framework to deal with the disputes.75 Even if
71. Dutch Foreign Ministry is in Two Minds about Crimean Scythian Gold, TASS (Apr.
3, 2014), http://tass.ru/en/world/726513 (quoting a statement from the State Hermitage
museum).
72. See Sophia Kishkovsky, Crimea’s Looted Treasure on the Political Agenda, THE
ART NEWSPAPER (Apr. 24, 2014), http://www.theartnewspaper.com/articles/Crimeas-lootedtreasure-on-the-political-agenda/32394 (describing the efforts Russia is taking to deal with
looting of art objects in Crimea); see also, Kakie kul’turnye ob’ekty poterjaet Ukraina vmeste s
Krymom (What cultural objects will Ukraine lose with the Crimea), THE INSIDER (Mar. 25,
2014), http://www.theinsider.ua/rus/art/kakie-kulturnye-obekty-poteryaet-ukraina-vmeste-skrymom (discussing how museum directors in Crimea feel about working with the Russian
Ministry of Culture and the uncertain future of the cultural heritage located in Crimea).
73. Mark Mackinnon, Ukrainian Staff Working Unpaid in History Museum to Preserve
Culture, GLOBE & MAIL (Nov. 7, 2014), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/arts/ukrainianstaff-working-unpaid-in-history-museum-to-preserve-culture/article21504462/ (interviewing
museum workers on their opinions about dealing with Russia instead of Ukraine). Russia has
emphasized their dedication to preserving the cultural heritage in Ukraine while besmirching
Ukraine’s lack of support to the cause. “During the last decade, the Ministry of Culture of
Ukraine . . . allocated no funds to the implementation of Reserve functions, including the
preservation of cultural heritage. Moreover, the Ukrainian Government adopted no programs
for the development of the Reserve.” U.N. Doc. 194 EX/32, supra note 69.
74. STAMATOUDI, supra note 63, at 189 (clarifying that cultural property claims are
usually international claims); cf. SCHÖNENBERGER, supra note 63, at 56 (noting that legal
instruments not based in private law can also facilitate the restitution of cultural assets).
75. See M. Vicien-Milburn, A. Garcia Marquez & A. Fouchard Papaesfstratiou,
UNESCO’s Role in the Restitution of Disputes on the Recovery of Cultural Property, 10
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the Dutch court does not apply the below international conventions, it
may refer to the internationally accepted guidelines in trying to
resolve the art conflict.76
1. The Hague Convention and Protocol
The Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the
Event of Armed Conflict (“The Hague Convention”) marked the first
time that the international community successfully drafted a
framework to protect the world’s cultural property.77 Following the
devastating impact of World War II on cultural heritage, The Hague
Convention reconvened in 1954 for the purpose of reestablishing
principles for the protection of cultural property during an armed
conflict.78
The Hague Convention applies to “partial or total occupation of
the territory” of a Member State, even if there is “no armed
resistance.”79 The signing parties “undertake to prohibit, prevent and,
if necessary, put a stop to any form of theft, pillage or
misappropriation of, and any act of vandalism directed against,
cultural property” in time of war.80 A country that occupies a Member
State’s territory, wholly or in part, is obliged to assist the occupied

TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. 2 (2013) (arguing that UNESCO’s “standard-setting activity in the
fight against the illicit traffic of cultural goods has contributed to the harmonization of the
legal framework for disputes on the recovery of cultural property”); see also STAMATOUDI,
supra note 63, at 178 (describing the role that international organizations have had in creating
consensus and agreement with international conventions).
76. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
77. John B. Gordon, The UNESCO Convention on the Illicit Movement of Art Treasures,
12 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 537, 538 (1971) (citing B. HOLLANDER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
ART 24 (1959)); Gao Sheng, International Protection of Cultural Property: Some Preliminary
Issues and the Role Of International Conventions, 12 S.Y.B.I.L. 57, 62-63 (2008) (noting that
the Hague convention was the first time the term “cultural property” was used).
78. See PATTY GERSTENBLITH, ART, CULTURAL HERITAGE, AND THE LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 475 (3d ed. 2012) (explaining that the United States only ratified the Hague
Convention after the fall of the Soviet Union because it was concerned that it would be
prevented from attacking the Kremlin, a historical monument); Gordon, supra note 77, at 538
(noting that the convention did not apply to non-military situations and left a gap in the
protection of cultural heritage).
79. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict
with Regulations for the Execution of the Convention, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240, art.
18, ¶ 2 [hereinafter Hague Convention] (“Recognizing that cultural property has suffered grave
damage during recent armed conflicts and that, by reason of the developments in the technique
of warfare, it is in increasing danger of destruction . . . . ”).
80. Id. art. 4, ¶ 3.
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country with the protection of its own cultural patrimony.81 This
clause is especially important to the dispute at issue, as Russia is seen
by Ukraine as an occupying power in Crimea.82 The Hague
Convention applies in the event of a declared war or any other armed
conflict between two or more Member States, “even if the state of war
is not recognized by” the countries involved.83 Again, this applies to
the current situation as Russia does not see itself as an occupying
party but considers Crimea completely within the Russian
Federation.84 The annexed Protocol to the Hague Convention further
emphasizes that each Member State has an obligation to prevent the
exportation of cultural property from a territory under its occupation
during an armed conflict, and to confiscate and return “cultural
property imported into its territory either directly or indirectly from an
occupied territory.”85
The Hague Convention and the annexed Protocol have been
signed and ratified by all of the parties involved in this conflict—the
Netherlands, Russia, and Ukraine.86 Ukraine takes the position that
Crimea is occupied by Russia and, consequently, it may argue in
court that the 1954 Hague Convention applies.87 If the Dutch court
decides to apply the Hague Convention, it likely will decide to return
the objects to Ukraine instead of Crimea in order to protect the art
objects from occupation and possible exportation into Russia.88

81. Id. art. 18, ¶ 1.
82. Law of Ukraine No. 1207-VII of April 15, 2014 On Securing the Rights and
Freedoms of Citizens and the Legal Regime on the Temporarily Occupied Territory of Ukraine
(with changes set forth by the Law No 1237-VII of May 6, 2014) [hereinafter Ukraine’s Law
on Occupied Crimea], available at http://mfa.gov.ua/en/news-feeds/foreign-officesnews/23095-law-of-ukraine-no-1207-vii-of-15-april-2014-on-securing-the-rights-andfreedoms-of-citizens-and-the-legal-regimeon-the-temporarily-occupied-territory-of-ukrainewith-changes-set-forth-by-the-law-no-1237-vii-of-6-may-2014 (declaring that the presence of
units and armed forces in the territory of Ukraine is an occupation of the sovereign state of
Ukraine).
83. Hague Convention, supra note 79, ¶ 1.
84. Ukraine Crisis, supra note 29 (referring to the referendum vote); Treaty to Accept
Crimea, Sevastopol to Russian Federation Signed, RT NEWS (Mar. 18, 2014), http://rt.com/
news/putin-include-crimea-sevastopol-russia-578/ (same).
85. Hague Convention, supra note 79.
86. See id.
87. ICOM Ukraine, FACEBOOK, (Apr. 2, 2014) https://www.facebook.com/icom.ukraine/
posts/730118943675428 (last visited Apr. 21, 2015) (issuing a statement on the Ukraine ICOM
Committee Facebook page stating that Ukraine has lost all access and ability to manage the
Crimean culture heritage objects and museums).
88. Hague Convention, supra note 79, art. 4, ¶ 3.
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2. The 1970 UNESCO Convention
The 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting
and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership
of Cultural Property (“the UNESCO Convention”) provides an
international framework for nations to work together to stop illicit
trafficking and promote the restitution of cultural heritage.89 The
Convention was adopted in November 1970 by the 16th General
Conference of UNESCO.90 It aims to attain a minimum level of
uniform protection for cultural heritage and mutual cooperation and
solidarity for the cause among the Member States.91
The UNESCO Convention broadly defines cultural objects that
Member States should protect by focusing on history, archeology, art,
science, and literature, but allows each State to designate what
constitutes cultural property and what should be protected.92 It also
covers the protection of property in case of war or occupation.93
Article 11 of the 1970 Convention states that any cultural property
that has been exported or transferred arising directly or indirectly
from an occupation will be considered “illicit.”94 Article 13 requires
State parties to prevent transfers of ownership of cultural property
likely to promote the illicit import or export of that property.95 Article
89. Vicien-Milburn, supra note 75, at 2 (clarifying that the 1970 UNESCO Convention
also encourages the restitution of cultural property); Convention on the Means of Prohibiting
and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov.
14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231, arts. 7b, 9 [hereinafter 1970 UNESCO Convention] (obliging
Contracting Countries to prohibit the importation of cultural property stolen from a museum or
monument in another Member State, and allows Contracting Countries whose cultural heritage
is in danger to ask other Member States for help in protecting the affected heritage).
90. PATRICK J. O’KEEFE, COMMENTARY ON THE UNESCO 1970 CONVENTION ON THE
MEANS OF PROHIBITING AND PREVENTING THE ILLICIT IMPORT, EXPORT AND TRANSFER OF
OWNERSHIP OF CULTURAL PROPERTY 1 (2d ed. 2007) (explaining that seventy-seven States
voted in favor of adoption, one against, and eight States abstained); Gordon, supra note 77, at
540 (commenting that as of March 10, 1971, no country had ratified or acceded to the
convention).
91. STAMATOUDI, supra note 63, at 33 (specifying that the UNESCO Convention is not
a self-executing legal instrument); see 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 89, Preamable
(“Considering that the protection of cultural heritage can be effective only if organized both
nationally and internationally among States working in close co-operation.”).
92. See O’KEEFE, supra note 90, at 37 (arguing that the text of Article 1 shows that each
State has the right to decide what is important for its own national cultural heritage); VicienMilburn, supra note 75, at 2 n.19 (same); see also 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 89,
art. 1.
93. See 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 89, art. 11.
94. See id.
95. See id. art. 13.
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13 also requires States to recognize the right of each signatory of the
UNESCO Convention to declare cultural property as “inalienable”
and to assist in the recovery of such property in cases where it has
been illegally exported.96 The UNESCO Convention does not define
what kinds of transfers are likely to promote illicit traffic.97 States
can, therefore, use their own legal systems to decide how to prevent
transfers of ownership that will promote illicit traffic.98 The text of
Article 15 allows Member States to make bilateral agreements to deal
with cultural heritage disputes, stating that international agreements
already in effect are not to be disturbed by the 1970 Convention.99
The use of diplomatic or settlement agreements is also an alternative
way of supplementing the UNESCO Convention or other cultural
heritage treaties by providing solutions which may be appropriate to a
specific region or conflict but which could not be “universalized.”100
The UNESCO Convention generally emphasizes the NationState.101 It highlights the protection of the national cultural heritage of
the country of origin.102 Russia, Ukraine, and the Netherlands have
also signed the UNESCO Convention.103 The UNESCO Convention’s
emphasis on the rights of Nation-States strengthens Ukraine’s
argument because Crimea is not a Nation-State, and therefore, cannot

96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See id. art. 15 (“Nothing in this Convention shall prevent State Parties thereto from
concluding special agreements among themselves or from continuing to implement agreements
already concluded regarding the restitution of cultural property removed, whatever the reason,
from its territory of origin, before the entry into force of this Convention for the States
concerned.”); O’KEEFE, supra note 90, at 89 (noting that agreements already in existence are
not affected by the coming into force of the 1970 UNESCO Convention).
99. See 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 89, art. 15; O’KEEFE, supra note 90, at
89 (clarifying that Article 15 does not permit a State to refuse to implement the 1970
UNESCO Convention unless a bilateral agreement is signed).
100. See O’KEEFE, supra note 90, at 89 (explaining that bilateral agreements are
supplementary to the Convention, but not a substitute); Gordon, supra note 77, at 552
(exploring the treaty signed between the United States and Mexico in July, 1970 to combat the
smuggling of colonial and pre Colombian artifacts as an example).
101. See John Henry Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking about Cultural Property, 80 AM.
J. INT’L L. 846 (arguing that the 1970 UNESCO Convention emphasizes the interests of States
in its preamble and throughout); STAMATOUDI, supra note 63, at 216 (referencing the
protection of the cultural heritage of the country of origin—the first principle of the
Convention).
102. See supra note 101 and accompanying text (describing the emphasis of the Nation
State in the 1970 UNESCO Convention).
103. See 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 89.
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claim any rights to the artifacts under the UNESCO Convention.104
Further, the 1970 Convention lacks in that it only provides a
framework of principles that Member States can follow in disputes,
but does not provide any rights that Member States could raise during
adjudications.105 It also does not deal with certain applicable issues
including cultural heritage issues in territories that have been
integrated into a former colonizing or occupying State, or disputes
involving the return of cultural property from museums in the capital
of a country that has split apart.106 UNESCO commissioned the
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law
(“UNIDROIT”) to draft an agreement that would supplement the
1970 Convention.107
3. The 1995 UNIDROIT Convention
The 1995 UNIDROIT Convention aimed to harmonize the laws
of participating countries regarding claims for the return of stolen or
illegally exported cultural property.108 Unfortunately, only a few
countries have ratified this convention.109 Article 5 of the Convention
states:
A cultural object which has been temporarily exported from the
territory of the requesting State, for purposes such as exhibition,
research or restoration, under a permit issued according to its law
regulating its export for the purpose of protecting its cultural

104. See supra note 101 and accompanying text (supporting Ukraine’s position in the
dispute).
105. See O’KEEFE, supra note 90, at 13 (noting that the 1970 Convention has to operate
within the framework of other laws and international treaties); Vicien-Milburn, supra note 75,
at 10 (same).
106. See O’KEEFE, supra note 90, at 80-81 (citing examples such as former States from
the Soviet Union, former States of Yugoslavia, Eritrea, and Bangladesh); cf. 1970 UNESCO
Convention, supra note 89, art. 12 (lacking language that resolves disputes between territories
or States that have split apart from Member States).
107. See O’KEEFE, supra note 90, at 13 (explaining that the 1970 UNESCO Convention
did not address private law matters like the bona fide purchaser for example); Xi Lian, A
Contemporary Observation on International Protection of Cultural Property, 4 CONTEMP.
READINGS L. & SOC. JUST. 855, 860 (2012) (same).
108. See O’KEEFE, supra note 90, at 13 (arguing that the UNIDROIT Convention
compliments the UNESCO Convention by giving individuals the right to sue directly in a
foreign court); Lian, supra note 107, at 860 (same).
109. See Status, UNIDROIT, available at http://www.unidroit.org/status-cp (last visited
Mar. 30, 2015).
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heritage and not returned in accordance with the terms of that
permit shall be deemed to have been illegally exported.110

In order for its return, the requesting State must show that the
removal of the object significantly impairs the physical preservation
of the object, the object’s integrity, the preservation of information of
the object, or that the object is of important cultural significance to
the requesting State.111
Both Ukraine and the Crimean museums could have used Article
5 from the UNIDROIT Convention for their arguments. However,
Ukraine has not signed the UNIDROIT Convention.112 Russia and the
Netherlands have signed it, but neither country has ratified nor
implemented it, making it unlikely that UNIDROIT will be used in
this dispute. International laws and conventions created to protect and
facilitate the return of cultural heritage are not always adequate.113
While they can provide a framework for how cultural heritage should
be protected and what principles should apply, they sometimes fall
short for legal arguments.114 Many States are not parties to these
conventions, leaving cultural heritage claims outside of the scope of
the international framework.115
4. National Cultural Heritage Laws
In the Netherlands, the Cultural Property Return from Occupied
Territory Act of 2007 (“2007 Cultural Property Act”) and the 1970
UNESCO Convention on the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of
Ownership of Cultural Property (Implementation) Act (“2009
110. See UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, June
24, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 1322, art. 5, ¶ 2.
111. Id. art. 5, ¶ 3.
112. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (referencing the text of the UNIDROIT
Convention).
113. Marie Cornu & Marc-André Renold, New Developments in the Restitution of
Cultural Property: Alternative Means of Dispute Resolution, 17 INT’L. J. CULT. PROP. 1, 2
(2010) (noting that French courts find legal grounds to justify the country’s refusal to adhere to
its obligations under an international convention); Vicien-Milburn supra note 75, at 5
(explaining that the conventions do not apply retroactively).
114. Vicien-Milburn, supra note 75, at 5 (noting that many States have not ratified the
conventions); Cornu & Renold, supra note 113, at 2 (same).
115. See ALESSANDRO CHECHI, PLURALITY AND COORDINATION OF DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT METHODS, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL CULTURAL HERITAGE LAW 184
(Francesco Francioni & James Gordley eds., 2013) (observing that international conventions
are not systematically recognized or enforced in countries); Vicien-Milburn, supra note 75, at
5 (same).
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Implementation Act”) provide a legal framework for the protection of
cultural heritage.116 By passing these acts, the Netherlands undertook
the responsibilities of preserving its own national heritage and
cooperating with the international community to protect the cultural
property of the Member States to the 1970 Convention.117
The 2007 Cultural Property Act was created to help repatriate
cultural property that was removed from a State during an armed
conflict.118 The Implementation Act deals with cultural goods that
were removed from a Member States’ territory in violation of a law
protecting its national heritage.119 It was created to coincide with the
2007 Cultural Property Act, so that a country asking for the return of
a cultural heritage object can begin a lawsuit in the Netherlands
instead of having to go to the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”).120
The Netherlands will respect each Member State’s definition of
cultural heritage as long as it complies with the texts of the
Conventions.121 Once a return proceeding is commenced, it is up to
the authorities of the requesting State to show that the disputed
objects are protected under its own laws.122 The Netherlands Supreme
Court has held that, in a matter of choice of law, or in reconciling the
laws of different legal jurisdictions, such as sovereign States, the
116. See generally Marja Van Hesse, The Implementation of the 1970 UNESCO
Convention in the Netherlands: A Legal and Practical Approach, 42 CAMBRIAN L. REV. 33,
34 n.4 (2011) (explaining that the laws contain rules on the taking into custody of cultural
property from an occupied territory during an armed conflict and for the initiation of
proceedings for the return of such property); Cultural Property Originating from Occupied
Territory (Return) Act) [hereinafter 2007 Cultural Property Act], available at
http://www.eui.eu/Projects/InternationalArtHeritageLaw/Netherlands.aspx; 1970 UNESCO
Convention on the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property
(Implementation) Act 2009 [hereinafter 2009 Implementation Act], available at
http://www.eui.eu/Projects/InternationalArtHeritageLaw/Netherlands.aspx.
117. See supra note 116 and accompanying text (referring to laws passed by the
Netherlands to implement the 1970 UNESCO Convention).
118. See Van Hesse, supra note 116, at 39 (describing the differences between the two
Netherlands acts). See generally 2007 Cultural Property Act, supra note 116.
119. See Van Hesse, supra note 116, at 39 (specifying that the Act complies with the
1970 UNESCO Convention). See generally 2009 Implementation Act, supra note 116.
120. See Van Hesse, supra note 116, at 39 (reasoning that the acts were designed to work
jointly in the situation of a cultural heritage dispute); cf. 2007 Cultural Property Act, supra
note 116; 2009 Implementation Act, supra note 116.
121. See Van Hesse, supra note 116, at 40 (noting that the Conventions purposefully
created a broad definition of cultural heritage); cf. 2007 Cultural Property Act, supra note 116;
2009 Implementation Act, supra note 116.
122. See Van Hesse, supra note 116, at 40 (implying that each State will have the
opportunity to defend its own cultural heritage because of the broadness of the definition); cf.
2007 Cultural Property Act, supra note 116; 2009 Implementation Act, supra note 116.
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Dutch court would apply another State’s law if it was the most
appropriate law for the conflict.123 The law of the country where the
issue or conflict took place will take precedence, and if the conflict
took place in more than one country, the law of the jurisdiction with
the closest link to the issue or conflict applies.124 As a result, Ukraine
may argue that the Netherlands should apply its national cultural
heritage laws created to protect the cultural heritage located within the
territory of Ukraine because it is the State where the conflict took
place.125
The Law of Ukraine on Protection of Cultural Heritage states
that archeological monuments, including movable objects, are the
State’s property.126 The objects must be included in the Museum fund
of Ukraine, registered with the Ministry of Culture, and preserved in
accordance with Ukrainian legislation.127 Ukraine also has a law that
specifically protects archeological heritage.128 The law defines
archeological heritage as “the system of archeological monuments
and shared territories, being under State protection, and also
moveable cultural values (archeological items), that comes from the
objects of the archeological heritage.”129 Article 18 of the law states
that any objects found as a result of archeological research, movable
and immovable objects, are State property.130 On April 15, 2014, the
Ukrainian Parliament adopted the law “On Ensuring Protection of the
Rights and Freedoms of Citizens and Legal Regime on the
Temporarily Occupied Territory of Ukraine” (“Ukraine’s Law on
Occupied Crimea”).131 The law states that the Russian Federation is
123. See HR, February 23, 1996, NJ 1997, 276, available at http://ec.europa.eu/
civiljustice/applicable_law/applicable_law_net_en.htm (illustrating that there are no statutory
regulations in respect to applying another country’s laws).
124. See id. (referencing the management of the affairs of another).
125. The Law of Ukraine on Protection of Cultural Heritage, Preamble in Law version N
2245-IV (2245-15) of December 16, 2014 [hereinafter Ukraine’s Cultural Heritage Law],
available at http://www.unesco.org/culture/natlaws/media/pdf/ukraine/ua_law_protection_
cultural_heritage_engtof.pdf; The Law of Ukraine, On Protection of Archeological Heritage,
VVR, 2004 [hereinafter Ukraine’s Archeological Heritage Law], available at
http://www.unesco.org/culture/natlaws/media/pdf/ukraine/ua_law_protection_archaelogical_h
eritage_engtof.pdf.
126. See Ukraine’s Cultural Heritage Law, supra note 125.
127. See id.
128. See Ukraine’s Archeological Heritage Law, supra note 125.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See Ukraine’s Law on Occupied Crimea, supra note 82; Olexander Martinenko et
al., Ukraine Creates a Special Legal Regime in the Crimea, KYIV POST (May 6, 2014),
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liable for any damage caused in connection with the military
intervention in the Crimea, including to legal entities, persona, and
cultural heritage located in the Crimean territory.132
According to Ukraine’s cultural heritage laws, cultural heritage
and archeological objects located in Ukraine are, first and foremost,
State property.133 Moreover, by passing the Law on Occupied Crimea,
Ukraine has officially indicated that it considers Crimea to be
temporarily occupied rather than permanently annexed, and will hold
Russia responsible for any damage to Ukraine’s cultural heritage.134
In court, Ukraine may use national laws such as the Law on Occupied
Crimea to argue that the art objects in dispute are actually Ukrainian
cultural heritage and should be kept out of occupying forces’ hands.135
C. How Ethics and Morals Fit Into the Discussion
Ethics and morality play a strong role in cultural heritage law
and preservation.136 Cultural heritage preservation laws were passed
internationally and by States because there is a mutual interest in the
information and enjoyment of cultural artifacts.137 The public interest
is served by the preservation, protection, and study of cultural objects;
and the damage, distortion, and suppression of cultural heritage are
unethical.138 Morality plays a strong role in the argument of cultural
nationalism and the idea that objects should be returned to their
http://www.kyivpost.com/content/company-news/ukraine-creates-a-special-legal-regime-inthe-crimea-346501.html (outlining the Law on Occupied Crimea).
132. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
133. See Ukraine’s Cultural Heritage Law, supra note 125.
134. See Ukraine’s Law on Occupied Crimea, supra note 82.
135. See Ukraine’s Cultural Heritage Laws, supra note 125; see Ukraine’s Law on
Occupied Crimea, supra note 82.
136. See generally JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, “CULTURAL PROPERTY ETHICS”
THINKING ABOUT THE ELGIN MARBLES, CRITICAL ESSAYS ON CULTURAL PROPERTY, ART
AND LAW 286 (defining ethics to mean action according to moral principles). Cf. CHECHI,
supra note 115, at 203 (describing international public policy as a set of principles that can
overcome rules and agreements because of broad consensus).
137. See CULTURAL PROPERTY ETHICS, supra note 136, at 287 (assuming that readers
agree with this proposition); cf. CHECHI, supra note 115, at 203 (arguing that international
public policy was promulgated under the creation of the international cultural heritage
conventions).
138. See CULTURAL PROPERTY ETHICS, supra note 136, at 287 (arguing that this selfinterest expresses an ethical principle that should bind others); see also The 1970 UNESCO
Convention, supra note 89, Preamble (“Considering that the interchange of cultural property
among nations for scientific, cultural and educational purposes increases the knowledge of the
civilization of Man, enriches the cultural life of all peoples and inspires mutual respect and
appreciation among nations.”).
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countries of origin because such objects are national icons, are
necessary for collections that are representative of a culture, or are
essential to the rituals or beliefs of current cultures.139
There are also object-centered ethical concerns.140 An object’s
integrity, preservation, or information could be at the center for the
moral argument to repatriate it, or, on the other hand, could limit its
movement.141 This art dispute is right at the center of the two ethical
frameworks. The Crimean museums have made the argument that it is
essential to return the objects to Crimea for the objects’ and
collections’ integrity and informational preservation.142 Ukraine,
however, argues that this dispute is simply part of the larger question
of Ukraine’s State sovereignty and cultural independence.143
II. CASE STUDIES OF PAST CULTURAL HERITAGE DISPUTES
Cultural heritage disputes in the past can demonstrate principles
and trends that courts have emphasized or upheld and could apply to
the current dispute. Part II considers international treaties that
included the division of objects of cultural heritage before the
emergence of international cultural heritage conventions. Next, Part II
examines the situation with the Preah Vihear temple in Southeast Asia
and how a cultural heritage dispute was decided “legally” but did not
resolve the issues involved. Finally, Part II reviews two cases that
involved the Soviet Union’s nationalization decrees of art and how
other countries chose to recognize and uphold the laws.

139. See CULTURAL PROPERTY ETHICS, supra note 136, at 294 (creating the elements of
an ethical decision structure). See generally Two Ways of Thinking about Cultural Property,
supra note 101 (explaining the difference between the theories of cultural nationalism and
internationalism in the context of cultural heritage).
140. See CULTURAL PROPERTY ETHICS, supra note 136, at 291 (arguing that aside from
cultural nationalism, object centered concerns may create questions of ethics); see also The
UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 110, art. 5, ¶ 3 (recognizing the importance of the
preservation and integrity of the art object in dispute).
141. See CULTURAL PROPERTY ETHICS, supra note 136, at 291 (asking if some objects
may be too fragile or delicate that movement exposes them to unacceptable risk);
STAMATOUDI, supra note 63, at 252 (arguing that cultural law should be applied with the
preservation and integrity of the art object in mind).
142. See Press Release, supra note 53 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (referencing the argument for returning
the disputed art objects to Ukraine).
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A. Treaties Dividing Cultural Heritage
Before the formation of UNESCO and the protection of cultural
heritage conventions, many cultural heritage disputes were solved
diplomatically and usually involved political compromises.144 Peace
treaties were used to distribute the cultural heritage objects after the
dissolution of multi-national States in Europe.145 However, there are
conceptual similarities between the peace treaties and what was later
adopted by the conventions, including the importance of State
ownership and territorial ties to the objects in dispute.146
The issue of repatriation of cultural property on a large scale was
first addressed in the unification of Italy.147 The Austro-Hungarian
Empire ceded the city of Venice, and the Austro-Italian Treaty of
1866 included articles that allowed Venice to claim ownership over
certain artwork.148 This treaty was one of the first attempts to deal
with the issue of cultural heritage repatriation that occurs because of

144. See generally Wojciech W. Kowalski, Repatriation Of Cultural Property Following
A Cession Of Territory Or Dissolution of Multinational States, 6 ART, ANTIQUITY & L. 139,
161 (2001) (examining cultural heritage repatriation issues following the cession of territory or
the dissolution of multinational States). See, e.g., ANA FILIPA VRDOLJAK, ENFORCEMENT OF
RESTITUTION OF CULTURAL HERITAGE THROUGH PEACE AGREEMENTS, ENFORCING
INTERNATIONAL CULTURAL HERITAGE LAW 33 (Francesco Francioni & James Gordley eds.,
2013) (arguing that post-First World War Treaties created principles that remain in current
international laws for the protection of cultural heritage); Andrzej Jakubowski, National
Museums in the Context of State Succession: The Negotiation of Difficult Pasts in the PostCold War Reality, in NATIONAL MUSEUMS AND THE NEGOTIATION OF DIFFICULT PASTS 19
(Dominique Poulot, José María Lanzarote Guiral & Felicity Bodenstein eds., 2013), available
at http://www.ep.liu.se/ecp/082/ecp12082.pdf (explaining that the allocation and distribution
of national cultural treasures in cases of state succession have since the end of World War I
have been essentially based on the territorial origin of artworks and the cultural significance of
such items for new nation-states).
145. See supra note 144 and accompanying text (examining the peace treaties that
attempted to apportion cultural heritage after disputes).
146. See VRDOLJAK, supra note 144, at 22 (arguing that peace agreements have been
especially important in the formulation of international protection of cultural heritage from the
early 20th century to the present); Kowalski, supra note 144, at 163 (same).
147. See Kowalski, supra note 144, at 140 (explaining that the Austrio-Hungarian Empire
was forced to cede several Italian territories, including the former Republic of Venice; cf.
Treaty of Peace between Austria-Hungary and Italy, signed at Vienna, 3 October 1866, 133
Consol. T.S. 209.
148. See Kowalski, supra note 144, at 140 (observing that the Italians initiated attempts
to repossess all works of art, historical objects and archives which at the time of the Habsburg
reign had been removed from Italy); cf. VRDOLJAK, supra note 144, at 32 (claiming that the
provisions were fueled by the ambitions of the new States and territories to recreate a national
culture).
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border changes in Europe.149 The cultural heritage objects were
divided based on their territorial links with the new State claiming
ownership and principles of reciprocity to lessen acrimony during the
process.150 For example, under the Austro-Italian Treaty, the Italian
party repossessed cultural property that had important connections to
the ceded territory, Venice.151 The treaty also specified that Austria
retained ownership titles, which could be found in the archives and
specifically pertained to the Austrian territory.152 One of the most
difficult cases in assigning cultural heritage rights arising out of the
Austro-Italian treaty was Raphael’s Madonna; the painting was kept
in Florence but was claimed by the Austrian Archduke Ferdinand on
the basis that the Grand Duke of Tuscany had ownership of the
painting.153 The issue was resolved when the parties agreed to allow
the painting to stay in Florence, but it had to be marked the “Grand
Duke’s Madonna” in honor of Ferdinand.154 The Austro-Italian case
study is an example of the kinds of diplomatic solutions that came
about prior to the contemporary cultural heritage treaties and
illustrates how compromises are made when politics are intertwined
with cultural heritage issues.155
Following World War I, cultural heritage division was also
addressed in the St. Germain Treaty of 1919 between the Allies and
Austria, and the Trianon Treaty of 1920 signed by the Allies and
149. See Kowalski, supra note 144, at 140 (examining the process of Italy’s claims as it
has been formally incorporated into the empire); cf. VRDOLJAK, supra note 144, at 32 (noting
that the treaty provisions signaled the idea of national cultural patrimony and the claims of
successor States).
150. See Kowalski, supra note 144, at 141 (emphasizing the restoration of the historical
integrity of Venice); VRDOLJAK, supra note 144, at 32 (affirming that the restitution of
cultural property was based on territoriality and State succession).
151. See Kowalski, supra note 144, at 141 (including a number of great Italian works of
art); see also VRDOLJAK, supra note 144, at 33 (maintaining that the new States and territories
saw the repatriation of culture heritage as a small step in righting a historic wrong).
152. See Kowalski, supra note 144, at 141 (specifying the principle of reciprocity); cf.
VRDOLJAK, supra note 144, at 32 (pointing out that Austria, as the predecessor state resisted
the dismantling of the Viennese collection).
153. See Kowalski, supra note 144, at 141-42 (clarifying that the Duke’s claims were
based on his former honour as the Grand Duke of Tuscany); cf. VRDOLJAK, supra note 144, at
32 (discussing Austria’s position that the cultural objects were part of imperial collections
forming part of its national heritage).
154. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
155. See Kowalski, supra note 144, at 142 (suggesting that alternative solutions may be
better than forcing judgment on ownership); Jakubowski, supra note 144, at 23 (recognizing
that cultural cooperation and protection of cultural heritage serve as efficient tools in postconflict reconciliation and stabilization of States and their boundaries).
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Hungary.156 The treaties contained provisions for the repatriation of
cultural property tied to the ceased territory, if the claimed objects had
been removed from that territory at the stipulated time before the
war.157 Both treaties stated that:
[A]ll artistic, archaeological, scientific or historic objects which
are part of the collections formerly belonging to the Government
or Crown of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy—unless decreed
otherwise, Austria as well as Hungary acknowledge to enter into
negotiations aimed at amicable agreement with the States
concerned and at their request, on the basis of which all the said
parts, objects and documents which belong to the cultural
heritage (patrimoine intellectuel) of the said States shall on the
principle of reciprocity be returned to their respective State of
origin.158

These territorial repatriation clauses were adopted in an attempt
to restore the integrity of the cultural heritage of territories or States
that recovered lost lands or developed new State systems under the
treaties.159 In article 195 of the Treaty of St. Germain, the treaty
created an adjudication procedure to resolve cultural heritage claims
by various successor States to be overseen by the Reparations
Commission.160 The Reparations Commission appointed a committee
to examine how objects in Austria’s possession were removed from
Italy, Belgium, Poland, or Czechoslovakia.161 The committee mostly
dealt with claims for cultural objects purchased by a reigning
Hapsburg monarch.162
156. See Kowalski, supra note 144, at 142 nn.7, 8 (citing the mentioned treaties);
VRDOLJAK, supra note 144, at 33 (addressing that the Treaty of St. Germain created a
Repatriation Committee).
157. Kowalski, supra note 144, at 143 (describing repatriation based on territoriality); cf.
VRDOLJAK, supra note 144, at 33 (affirming that the Treaty of Saint-Germain favored the
principle of territoriality).
158. Kowalski, supra note 144, at 145 (quoting Article 196 of the St Germain treaty and
Article 177 of the Trianon Treaty).
159. See VRDOLJAK, supra note 144, at 32 (claiming that the redistribution of cultural
property was an attempt for new States and territories to recreate, or create for the first time, a
national culture); Kowalski, supra note 144, at 145 (same).
160. See VRDOLJAK, supra note 144, at 34 (clarifying that the procedure would resolve
claims by various successor States); Treaty of Peace between Allied and Associated Power and
Austria, signed at Saint-Germain-en-Laye on September 10, 1919, 226 Consol. T.S. 8, art. 195
[hereinafter “The Treaty of St. Germain”] (specifying that Italy and Austria agree to accept the
decisions of the Committee).
161. The Treaty of St. Germain, supra note 160, art. 195 (stating that the Committee was
to examine how the art objects were “carried off” from the claiming State or territory).
162. Id. (specifying the House of Hapsburg and other Houses reigning in Italy).
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The repatriation cases involving the Hapsburg monarch,
however, always went in favor of the monarch over the claimant
State.163 Claimant States would argue that the objects were part of
their “public domain” and should be returned upon the dissolution of
the empire.164 Austria argued that the States could not have a legal
claim over the objects because they became the “personal property of
the Hapsburg monarch” when they were purchased.165 In all the cases
dealing with the Hapsburg monarch, Austria’s personal property
rights claim won over the “public domain” argument.166
The Committee categorically rejected the Czechoslovak
argument that it should ‘right a historic wrong’ by reversing the
centralizing policies of the Hapsburg monarchy which for
centuries had removed cultural heritage from all corners of its
empire. It also refused to ‘be guided by justice, equity[,] and
good faith[,’] maintaining it had no authority to deviate from
established judicial methods.167

Hungary also protested the “territorial link” in repatriation cases
as the trigger for selecting and returning certain objects to ceded
territories.168 It advocated for the principle of nationality so that the
Hungarian people could claim their cultural heritage “regardless of
the territory of post-war Hungary.”169
The Treaty of Peace with Italy, signed in 1947, included clauses
concerning territorial concessions in favor of new borders, including
border corrections for the benefit of France, certain territories ceded
to Yugoslavia, or several islands conveyed to Greece.170 Appendix
163. See VRDOLJAK, supra note 144, at 35 (explaining that even though claims were
between two States, the Committee would rely on predecessor State constitutional
arrangements); Kowalski, supra note 144 at, 144 (musing that very few claims were submitted
and the Committee did not find the grounds to uphold them).
164. See VRDOLJAK, supra note 144, at 34-35 (describing the principle of territorial
importance)
165. See VRDOLJAK, supra note 144, at 35 (emphasizing the principle of property).
166. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
167. VRDOLJAK, supra note 144, at 35 (ignoring the unequal relations between the
parties that had created the dispute in the first place).
168. VRDOLJAK, supra note 144, at 36 (referring to the Treaty of Trianon); Kowalski,
supra note 144, at 145 (same).
169. See VRDOLJAK, supra note 144, at 36 (mentioning that the territorial principle
remained supreme despite Hungary’s assertions).
170. See Kowalski, supra note 144, at 153 (explaining that the general principle of
repatriation expressed in this treaty was based on the criterion of the ties of a given object to
the cultural heritage of the ceded territory); Treaty of Peace with Italy, Paris, 10 February
1947, 61 Stat. 1245 (referencing the victory of the Allies).
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XIV of the Treaty contained the following important repatriation
clause, pursuant to which the Italian government was obliged to hand
over to the above-mentioned successor States: “[A]ll objects of
artistic, historic[,] or archeological value belonging to the cultural
heritage of the ceased territory, which, at the time of Italian rule, had
been removed from the said territory without any compensation and
are in the possession of the Italian government or Italian public
institutions.”171
The general “principle of repatriation” expressed in this clause is
based on the ties the claimed object had to the cultural heritage of the
ceded territory.172
As the above case studies demonstrate, post-war efforts to return
cultural heritage to ceding states and their emphasis on territoriality
are important precedents for contemporary cultural property law.173
The common theme to be drawn from the above discussion on
international agreements is that they all adopted the principle of
territorial ties.174 The territorial criteria were used primarily for
practical reasons so claims would provide the correct documentation
as proof.175 This similar principle would later be emphasized by the
international UNESCO conventions created to protect cultural
property and create a mechanism to allow Nation-States to initiate
repatriation claims.176
With differing national narratives, there were inevitable
arguments between the Predecessor State and Successor State over
the same property.177 As the following case demonstrates, despite the
171. See Kowalski, supra note 144, at 153.
172. See id. (citing the case of Yugoslavia as the above clause was even extended to
include objects that were removed after World War I.).
173. See supra 146 and accompanying text (discussing the use of territorial links in
cultural heritage distribution).
174. See Kowalski, supra note 144, at 163 (applying the principle of territorial ties and
appurtenance to the “patrimoine intellectuel”); see also VRDOLJAK, supra note 157, at 38
(expounding on how post-war efforts “fostered an environment . . . . for the restitution of
cultural objects which were illicitly removed from their country of origin”).
175. See Kowalski, supra note 144, at 164 (acknowledging that in the absence of
documentation, a more general criterion of appurtenance to the “patrimoine intellectual” of a
given nationis employed); cf. Jakubowski, supra note 144, at 23 (asserting that the principle of
territoriality could provide conveniently predictable solutions but cannot be consistently
applied to all the scenarios).
176. See supra notes 102, 105 and accompanying text (introducing the UNESCO
conventions).
177. VRDOLJAK, supra note 144, at 34 (acknowledging that the symbolic significance of
the possession of the disputed cultural objects for both national identities rendered them
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principles and rules for cultural property repatriation set forth in laws
and treaties, the reality of cultural property ownership can produce
harsh results that only fuel animosity among countries or cultural
groups.178
B. The Border Dispute Surrounding the Temple of Preah Vihear
The Preah Vihear case shows the long-term damaging effects
that a heritage dispute can have on countries when politics and
territorial borders are emphasized over cultural significance.179 Preah
Vihear is an eleventh century Hindu Temple built on the border of
Cambodia and Thailand.180 Both Cambodia and Thailand claimed
ownership over the temple and the surrounding area.181 The ICJ was
asked to decide the border dispute between the two countries.182 In
1962, the ICJ came to its decision by looking at the 1904 boundary
settlement between Thailand and France, as Cambodia was a French
problematic); Jakubowski, supra note 144, at 23 (pointing out that the rights of successor
states based on the territorial linkage were often challenged by the principle of their great
importance to the intellectual patrimony and cultural identity of the predecessor state).
178. See generally Lucas Lixinski et al., Identity Beyond Borders: International Cultural
Heritage Law and the Temple of Preah Vihear Dispute, 20 ILSA Q. 30 (2011) (concluding
that the ICJ made a mistake by not considering culture and history when deciding the dispute
over the Preah Vihear Temple); Monticha Pakdeekong, Who Owns the Preah Vihear Temple?
A Thai Position, 2 J. E. ASIA & INT’L L. 229 (2009) (arguing that the Decision of the
International Court of Justice on June 15, 1962, did not, as claimed by Cambodia in 1959,
determine any land boundary between Thailand and Cambodia); Bora Touch, Who Owns the
Preah Vihear Temple? A Cambodian Position, 2 J. E. ASIA & INT’L L. 205 (2009)
(maintaining that the ICJ decision did determine a boundary between Thailand and Cambodia).
179. See supra note 178 and accompanying text (introducing the Preah Vihear case
study).
180. See Lixinski et al., supra note 178, at 32 (describing that the Temple overlooks the
Cambodian plains to the south, and Thailand to the north.); Pakdeekong, supra note 178, at
229 (noting that both Cambodians and Thais enjoyed the Temple for religious purposes,
conducting trade, and it served as the centre between the high-Khmer and the low-Khmer
communities).
181. See Lixinski et al., supra note 178, at 32 (referring to the 192 ICJ cases);
Pakdeekong, supra note 178, at 230 (explaining that the dispute originated due to the
ambiguous frontier line constituted by the provisions of the 1904 and 1907 Siam-Franco
treaties).
182. See Lixinski et al., supra note 178, at 32 (analyzing the case as a textbook example
of the application of the doctrines of acquiescence and estoppel because, according to the
judgment of the ICJ, Thailand’s lack of protest until the case was initiated in 1962 amounted to
an endorsement of the boundary as set in the French treaties). See generally Case Concerning
the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Merits, [1962] I.C.J. Rep. 6 [hereinafter
the Preah Vihear Case] (rejecting the objection of the Government of Thailand and finding that
it had jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dispute submitted to it on Oct. 6, 1959 by the
Application of the Government of Cambodia).
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protectorate.183 The settlement included maps that were drawn by
French geographers and gave the disputed area to Cambodia.184 The
ICJ found that because Thailand never protested the maps, they were
still controlling and the disputed area belonged to Cambodia.185
Despite this decision, between 1962 and 2011 there were recurrent
violent protests and boundary disputes, even after the Thai
government issued a statement reiterating its compliance with the ICJ
judgment.186
The ICJ expressly dismissed the application of cultural heritage
laws when making the 1962 judgment holding that, “[t]he Parties
have also relied on other arguments of a physical, historical, religious
and archeological character but the Court is unable to regard them as
legally decisive.”187 In a separate opinion, Judge Fitzmaurice further
explained that the Treaty between France and Siam (now Thailand)
must take precedence over any cultural or historical evidence.188
Judge Fitzmaurice wrote: “[E]xtraneous factors which might have
weighed . . . in making that settlement, and more particularly in
determining how the line of the frontier was to run, can only have an
incidental relevance in determining where today, as a matter of law, it
does run.”189
The Preah Vihear situation suggests that the ICJ viewed history
and culture as only secondary in determining ownership of the

183. See Preah Vihear Case, supra note 182, at 19 (analyzing the 1904 Treaty).
184. See Lixinski et al., supra note 178, at 32 (including the map from the ICJ
Judgment); Pakdeekong, supra note 178, at 231 (arguing that the Court did not rule that the
map showed the frontier line between Thailand and Cambodia).
185. See Preah Vihear Case, supra note 182, at 22 (determining that the borders outlined
on the map was communicated to the Thai members of the Mixed Commission).
186. See Lixinski et al., supra note 178, at 32 (explaining that the Thai population
accused Cambodia and the ICJ of stealing the country’s territory and cultural landmark);
Pakdeekong, supra note 178, at 233 (adding that the Thai government formally informed the
UN Acting Secretary-General on July 6, 1962, that the government “desires to make an
express reservation regarding whatever rights Thailand has, or may have in the future, to
recover the Temple of [Preah Vihear] . . . and to register a protest against the decision of the
International Court of Justice”).
187. See Lixinski et al., supra note 178, at 35 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vinher (Cambodia v. Thai.) 1962 I.C.J. 6, 13
(June 15) (Merits).
188. Preah Vihear Case, supra note 182 (separate opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice), as
quoted in Lixinski et al., supra note 178, at 35 (shedding light on why the Court dismissed
evidence related to the historical, cultural and archaeological importance of the Temple).
189. See id. (declining to consider the importance of historical or cultural context).
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temple.190 The people of Thailand and Cambodia felt differently.191
While decisive legal conclusions are important, some cultural heritage
scholars believe that courts should consider, and cultural heritage law
should reflect, the complications and nuances involved in disputes to
try to come to a better solution for the people involved.192
Preah Vihear draws interesting parallels to the current dispute in
Ukraine as both situations deal with a cultural heritage issues that
emerged from a border dispute.193 The ICJ emphasized the treaty and
the legal documents to make a decision, but it did not necessarily
solve the underlying issue or create the most ethical of conclusions.194
The same result may repeat itself with the current art dispute between
Ukraine and Crimea.
C. Soviet Union Case Studies
Another example of the difficulties involved in a cultural
repatriation lies in Russia’s history with art property, which may set a
negative precedent for Crimea’s museums. Courts in England and
France considered cases that dealt with the nationalization of private
assets by the Soviet Union.195 The outcome in both cases, as
190. See Lixinski et al., supra note 178, at 35 (referring to the language of Judge
Fitzmaurice); Preah Vihear Case, supra note 182 (separate opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice), 5153 (saying that “for these factors to have any serious influence, it would at least be necessary
that they should all point in the same direction, and furnish unambiguous indications”).
191. See Saing Soenthrith & Zsombor Peter, Military Protests New Thai Fence Near
Preah Vihear, CAMBODIA DAILY (June 2, 2014), https://www.cambodiadaily.com/archives/
military-protests-new-thai-fence-near-preah-vihear-border-60141/ (reporting that Cambodia
has accused the Thai army of erecting a new barbed wire fence on land near Preah Vihear
temple, and has asked Thailand to tear it down); Ouch Sony & George Wright, Preah Vihear
Villagers Staying at Pagoda March to National Assembly, CAMBODIA DAILY (Nov. 18, 2014),
https://www.cambodiadaily.com/news/preah-vihear-villagers-staying-at-pagoda-march-toassembly-72512/ (claiming that soldiers dismantled houses and farms on the land surrounding
Preah Vihear temple).
192. See Lixinski et al., supra note 178, at 35 (dismissing the reasoning used in the ICJ
judgment the product of a different era); STAMATOUDI, supra note 63, at 252 (arguing that
cultural property law should reflect certain ethical guiding principles like humanitarian
considerations).
193. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (explaining that the Ukraine-Crimea art
conflict occurred only after Russia annexed Crimea). Preah Vihear occurred due to a border
dispute between Cambodia and Thailand. See supra note 178 and accompanying text
(explaining the Preah Vihear dispute).
194. See Lixinski et al., supra note 178, at 35 (referring to the violence that occurred
after the judgment); Soenthrith, supra note 191 (same).
195. See SCHÖNENBERGER, supra note 63, at 34 (describing the Princess Paley Olga v.
Weisz case); Jane Graham, “From Russia” Without Love: Can The Shchukin Heirs Recover
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illustrated below, was that seizures of private art were legal because
of the “Act of State doctrine.”196 This parallels the current situation
with the art conflict where the Dutch court may not be able to rule in
favor of the Crimean museums because they have to uphold the
national laws of Ukraine.
In Princess Paley Olga v. Weisz, Princess Paley Olga, the widow
of Russian Grand Duke Paul, who was arrested in 1918, was
requisitioned and her valuable furniture and works of art were taken
by the Soviet government.197 The Soviet Union then sold some of her
artwork.198 Once she found out that her artwork was in England, she
sued the new owner of the artworks, Weisz.199 The reviewing English
court considered a decree issued by the All-Russian Central
Committee and the People’s Commissariat of March 18, 1923, under
which all works of art and antiquities became the property of the
State, as well as a decree signed by Lenin on March 5, 1921,
according to which the property of citizens who have fled the
Republic were now the property of the Russian Soviet Socialist
Republic.200 Both decrees were regarded as valid by the court because
the confiscation of property by a foreign government recognized by
the Crown could not be called into question.201 In essence, the courts
could not rule against the laws of a “recognized foreign power” in a
case dealing with that country’s citizens.202
Similarly, in the Shchukin litigation, Irina Shchukina, the
daughter of a famous Russian art collector and a descendent of
Their Ancestor’s Art Collection?, 6 U. DENV. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 65, 71 (2009) (recounting
the Shchukina litigation).
196. See SCHÖNENBERGER, supra note 63, at 34 (explaining that the Act of State
doctrine provides that courts of a country recognizing the legitimacy of a foreign government
cannot overrule the laws of the same foreign government on the issue of property as long as
the situation only deals with the other country’s citizens); cf. Graham, supra note 195, at 96-97
(emphasizing that the nationalization of a recognized government destroyed any personal titles
people may have).
197. SCHÖNENBERGER, supra note 63, at 34 (recounting the personal history of the
claimant); Princess Paley Olga v. Weisz, [1929] 1 K.B. 718 at 722-23 (Eng.) (same).
198. See supra note 197 and accompanying text (establishing the facts of the case).
199. SCHÖNENBERGER, supra note 63, at 34-35 (noting that Princess Paley also claimed
compensation for damages); Princess Paley, supra note 197, at 722 (same).
200. SCHÖNENBERGER, supra note 63, at 35 (explaining the decrees signed by Lenin to
nationalize important artwork); Princess Paley, supra note 197, at 722-23 (affirming that the
paintings were in a State museum pursuant to the decrees).
201. SCHÖNENBERGER, supra note 63, at 35 (restating the Act of State doctrine);
Princess Paley, supra note 197, at 723-24 (asserting the recognition of the Soviet government
by France).
202. See supra note 196 (discussing the Act of State doctrine).
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Morozov, another prominent art collector, lost both art collections to
the Soviet Union by way of decrees in 1918.203 Following the breakup
of the Soviet Union, Schukina and Morozov made a claim for their
lost artwork while some of the pieces were on loan from Russia in the
Centre Pompidou in Paris.204 A French court denied their claims
because France accepts decrees of nationalization issued by
recognized foreign governments, such as the Soviet Union,
concerning their own territory and people.205 These two cases
illustrate that repatriation may be difficult in situations where the law
is against the claimant.206 If these same principles are applied to the
Scythian gold on loan in the Netherlands, the Crimean museums may
face similar difficulties as they will have to argue for cultural
repatriation against Ukrainian laws and possibly international
conventions.
The three case studies examined in Part II involve cultural
heritage disputes that are different from the current dispute between
Crimea and Ukraine.207 However, they each contain similar elements
and principles that prove to illustrate what arguments may prevail in
the art dispute. The treaties that dealt with the breakup of States and
State succession emphasized territoriality when dividing cultural
property.208 This principle was also used in the international
conventions created to protect cultural heritage such as the 1954
Hague Convention and the UNESCO Conventions.209 Second, courts
may have to decide disputes based on the law (or a treaty) instead of

203. SCHÖNENBERGER, supra note 63, at 35 (describing the facts of the Shchukina
litigation); Graham, supra note 195, at 70 (highlighting that Ivan Morozov’s home was to
become a museum of Modem Western Art and would be opened to the public).
204. SCHÖNENBERGER, supra note 63, at 35 (clarifying that the paintings were on loan
from the Pushkin and Hermitage museums in Russia); Graham, supra note 195, at 71 (same).
205. SCHÖNENBERGER, supra note 63, at 36 (citing the Act of State doctrine); Graham,
supra note 195, at 71-72 (musing that the French government asked Madame Matisse to
approach Irina Shchukin and make her promise that she would not try to institute another
lawsuit if the paintings in question were displayed in Paris again).
206. SCHÖNENBERGER, supra note 63, at 35-36 (recounting that both individual parties
lost to the decree of the government). See generally Princess Paley, supra note 197 (ruling
based on the Act of State doctrine).
207. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (explaining the facts of the art dispute).
208. See supra note 144 and accompanying text (introducing the principle of
territoriality in international treaties).
209. See Two Ways of Thinking about Cultural Property, supra note 101, at 845-46
(discussing the emphasis of the State in international cultural heritage conventions);
STAMATOUDI, supra note 63, at 216 (same).
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taking the cultural history into consideration.210 While it is important
that courts follow laws instead of personal morals, this does not
always lead to the best result for the cultural heritage and the people
affected by the decisions.211 Finally, the cases dealing with Soviet Art
nationalization illustrate that courts will not go against the laws of a
recognized country like Ukraine, to satisfy a personal cultural heritage
claim.212
III. APPLYING INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRECEDENTS TO
THE CONFLICT
Unfortunately, this conflict may result in a battle between legal
and moral principles where the moral arguments do not hold up.213 By
cultural heritage moral standards, including the physical preservation
and integrity of the objects, the artifacts on loan should go back to
where they originated, to the museums that have continuously
preserved and studied them.214 The Netherlands, however, has not
recognized Russia’s annexation of Crimea and must fulfill its
obligations to Ukraine.215 Part III first analyzes the applicability of the
international cultural heritage conventions and national laws, and
second draws important lessons from the case studies examined
above.
Regardless of the label given to the crisis in Ukraine, the Hague
Convention could still apply because Crimea was occupied by
Russian troops.216 Ukraine could argue that the Netherlands has a duty
under the UNESCO Convention and the Hague Convention to keep
the objects safe and out of the hands of the occupying hostile State.217
The biggest problem for the Crimean museums is that the entire rest
210. See supra note 178 and accompanying text (dismissing the historical, physical or
archeological arguments).
211. See Soenthrith, supra note 191 (referring to the protests and altercations); Sony,
supra note 191 (same).
212. See supra note 196 and accompanying text (discussing the Act of State doctrine).
213. Dutch Foreign Ministry, supra note 71, ¶ 10 (referring to the assessment of the
dispute by the director of the State Hermitage Museum in St. Petersburg, Russia).
214. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (explaining the ethical principles
involved in cultural heritage repatriation arguments).
215. Durr, supra note 1, ¶¶ 3, 4, 11 (discussing the Netherlands’ obligation to Ukraine);
Neuendorf, supra note 9 (same).
216. Ukraine Crisis, supra note 29, ¶¶ 4, 18 (describing the Russian unmarked troops);
Ukraine Creates a Special Legal Regime in Crimea, supra note 131, ¶ 10.
217. See Hague Convention, supra note 79, art. 4, ¶ 3; 1970 UNESCO Convention,
supra note 93, art. 11.
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of the world does not recognize Russia’s annexation of Crimea.218
The Dutch Court may feel compelled politically to return the objects
to Kiev instead of effectively handing them over to Russia.219
Moreover, there is no precedent for courts to overrule the law of
another recognized country for moral reasons alone.220
The cultural heritage case studies consistently show that courts
and treaties favor and protect the cultural heritage of a State instead of
the people.221 Although at first glance it appears that the emphasis on
territoriality in the treaties supported the return of the objects to
Crimea, a deeper analysis reveals that such treaty provisions were
used to emphasize State supremacy “even at the expense of the
principle of protecting the integrity of important collections, together
with the consistent application of reciprocity.”222 Because Crimea is
not an independent territory and the Netherlands does not recognize
Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the emphasis on State supremacy may
mean that Crimean museums will not be able to legally defend their
arguments for the return of the art objects.223 Unless the loan
agreements clearly show that museum ownership overrules the State’s
claim to ownership, the Crimean museums do not have a good case.224
CONCLUSION
Existing laws and the past examples examined in this Note do
not create a hopeful situation for the Crimean museums. Although the
Crimean museums make a strong moral argument for why the
artifacts should go back to Crimea, there is little legal precedent that
will support the museum’s claim to the artifacts. The words of Dr.
Mikhail Piotrovsky, the Director General of the State Hermitage
Museum in St Petersburg, supports this Note’s conclusions: “[f]rom
218. See Territorial Integrity of Ukraine, supra note 15, at 2 (calling upon all States not
to recognize Russia’s annexation of Crimea).
219. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (discussing the complicated political
nature of the art dispute).
220. See supra note 196 (discussing the Act of State doctrine).
221. See Lixinski, supra note 178, at 35 (discussing the ICJ’s refusal to apply historical
and archeological arguments to the Preah Vihear case); supra note 196 and accompanying text
(defining the Act of State doctrine).
222. See Kowalski, supra note 144, at 145 (asserting that this was done to restore the
integrity of the culture of the new State or territory).
223. See supra note 157 and accompanying text (regarding the emphasis on State
supremacy and the principle of territoriality).
224. Durr, supra note 1, ¶¶ 3, 5, 10 (discussing the loan agreements between the Allard
Pierson Museum, Ukraine, and the Crimean museums).
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the ethical grounds, the exhibits should return to the museums where
they have been kept for hundreds of years but from the legal angle of
view, they may belong to the museum fund of the country, from the
territory of which they were loaned.”225 This outcome is unfortunate
because it shows that international and domestic laws do not provide
for the most moral result.
A possible solution is to find an alternative to a legal judgment.
For example, the parties could agree to let the Netherlands keep the
collections until the political situation is resolved. Another solution
might be for the parties to allow the collections to continue traveling
and touring museums abroad, furthering the goals of cultural
cooperation and diplomacy, until a fair solution is agreed to by all
involved. While a bilateral agreement is unlikely because of the
current tumultuous relationship between Russia and Ukraine, an
alternative solution will allow the parties to rise above the politicized
nature of the dispute and work together to find a solution that protects
the cultural heritage itself.

225. Dutch Foreign Ministry, supra note 71, ¶ 11 (calling for a professional, ethical and
legal discussion of the dispute).

